

# SABA DEVDARIANI

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## Contact:

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences  
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## Education:

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY	2016-Present
– Ph.D. in Social Sciences . Committee: Thomas R. Palfrey (chair), Alex V. Hirsch (advisor), Michael Gibilisco, Luciano Pomatto – M.S. in Social Sciences (2018).	
International School of Economics at TSU (ISET)	2012-2014
– M.A. in Economics	
IVANE JAVAKISHVILI TBILISI STATE UNIVERSITY (TSU)	2008-2012
– B.A. in Business Administration	

## Teaching and Work Experience:

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Teaching Assistant	
Introduction to Economics, Professor Antonio Rangel	Winter 2019-2021
Undergraduate Game Theory, Professor Omer Tamuz	Winter 2018, Spring 2020
Introduction to Economics, Professor Charlie Plott	Fall 2017, Fall 2018, Fall 2019
A History of Budgetary Politics in the United States, Professor Roderick Kiewiet	Spring 2018, Spring 2019
ISET Policy Institute, Senior Researcher	2014-2016
The University of Georgia, Invited Lecturer	
Graduate Industrial Organization	Spring 2015, Spring 2016
Undergraduate Microeconomic Theory II	Winter 2015, Winter 2016
Undergraduate Microeconomic Theory I	Fall 2014, Fall 2015
International School of Economics at TSU, Teaching Assistant	
Graduate Game Theory, Professor Avner Shaked	Spring 2014
Graduate Microeconomic Theory II, Professor Sergei Izmalkov	Winter 2014
Graduate Macroeconomic Theory I, Professor Adam Pellillo	Fall 2013
Graduate Microeconomic Theory I, Professor Florian Biermann	Spring 2013
Calculus, Teaching Assistant for Professor Tornike Kadeishvili	Summer 2012

## Publications:

“Fake News, Information Herds, Cascades and Economic Knowledge” with Lazarina Butkovich, Nina Butkovich, Charles R. Plott and Han Seo, *Public Finance Review* 48, no. 6 (2020): 806-828.

## WORKING PAPERS:

### “External Shocks and Anticipatory Pandering” (*Job Market Paper*)

*Abstract:* Some external shocks are out of control of elected politicians even if they can still anticipate their occurrence better than the general public. How can politicians use these types of anticipated external shocks to their benefit? How does it change their pandering incentives? And how does a rational voter incorporate these,

seemingly irrelevant, external shocks in their voting decision? We build on the political accountability model of Canes-Wrone Herron Shotts, adding the ability to the voter to observe their utility, which is affected by external shock. The shock is observed by the incumbent politician but not the voter. We show that the incumbent's policy choice affects his reelection prospects through a direct channel- a different voting strategy for different policy choice- and indirect channel- policy choice affects voting decision through the voter's utility. A combination of these two channels shapes strategic incentives for the incumbent politician. Our analyses show that for high/low enough magnitude external shocks, a politician's ability to anticipate them eliminates his pandering incentives in equilibrium. For medium negative shocks, pandering could be a "gamble for resurrection," while for medium positive shocks, it acts as an "insurance" to guarantee the reelection. We show that both of these pandering regions emerge in equilibrium. Politician's ability to anticipate external shocks eliminates some unnecessary pandering in equilibrium and for some realizations of the external shock also improves the selection. However, the politician's knowledge of the shock, overall, decreases the voter's welfare in equilibrium.

## WORK IN PROGRESS:

### “Formal Requirements for Inducing More Fair Outcomes”

*Abstract:* Medicare prices for medical services, both directly and indirectly, influence the total expenditure on physical care and medical services in the U.S., which amounts to more than 3% of the GDP. Yet, there is an empirical evidence showing that the way the Medicare advisory committee operates makes its recommendations biased. This paper proposes improvement on the current procedure to decrease this bias. This setup is common to other advisory committees and therefore we analyze general case of delegated information acquisition with a biased agent who has private information about the state of the world. The additional information acquired is public and its informativeness increases with costly effort. Equilibria are characterized for two cases: (1) when the agent has a discretion on effort level and (2) when a principal imposes formal requirements on effort depending on private report from the agent. The analysis demonstrates that even when the principal cannot commit to an arbitrary decision rule about the final policy choice, he benefits from imposing formal requirements by getting as much public information as possible and correctly aligning the biased agent's incentives. In mechanism we propose, the principal incentivizes the agent with low private information to truthfully reveal this information by requiring a relatively low amount of costly effort. On contrary, the high private report from the agent has to be supported by the maximum effort in public signal.

### “Voter Attention and Electoral Accountability” (with Alex V. Hirsch)

## CONFERENCES AND TRAININGS:

<b>CERGE-EI</b>	2014
<i>Graduate Teaching Fellows Teaching Principles and Practices for Economics Courses</i>	
<b>The Armenian Economic Association Annual Meetings 2014</b>	2014
<i>The Second Place recipient of the Grigor Artsuni Award for Young Scholars</i>	
<b>Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (TSU)</b>	2009
<i>The best presentation at the Interuniversity Scientific Conference</i>	

## SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS:

Recipient of a <b>Certificate of Achievement for Outstanding Teaching Performance</b> , ISET	2014
Recipient of a <b>Future Leader Scholarship</b> , International School of Economics at TSU (ISET)	2012
Awarded a <b>Full State Scholarship</b> , MA, International School of Economics at TSU (ISET)	2012
Awarded a <b>President's bi-annual stipend</b> , Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (TSU)	2009-2010
Awarded a <b>Full State Scholarship</b> , BA, Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (TSU)	2008

## Research Interest:

Applied Theory in Political Science, Bureaucracy, American Politics, Experimental Economics, Matching Theory

## Skills:

- Stata, Matlab, Python, R
- Georgian (native), English (fluent), Russian (advanced)